Bill McIntyre
03-08-2007, 05:00 PM
If you don't want to wade throught it all, here is a key section
Key to the Zinni post conflict plan was keeping the
Iraqi Army intact. There were plans for how to not destroy the Iraqi Army
so that they could be the foundation for rebuilding the Iraqi military so
that Iraq could remain a counter balance to Iran. Also key to our post
conflict plan was rapidly rebuilding an Iraqi government. The first acts of
Paul Bremmer were to disband the Iraqi Army and refuse to allow former
Baathists in the new government. If the paucity of ground forces didn't
doom the U.S. effort, these two acts did. We have been playing catch-up
ever since. The Army and Marines have carried this war and every success we have had has been on the backs of the Soldiers and Marines that walk patrol everyday.
***************************************
RICHARD L. STOUDER
Director Technology Development and Deployment
National Security Directorate
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
I was assigned to US Central Command in 1992 after graduating from the
National War College. For my first year I was assigned as the lead for the
OPLAN that was the redux of Desert Shield - Desert Storm. The culmination
of that first year was Gen Hoar and I briefing the OPLAN for approval to the
SecDef. In the room were Dick Cheney, the CJCS, Colin Powell, and the one
of Cheney's Undersecs, Paul Wolfowitz. This was the first rewritten OPLAN
since the first Gulf War. I think it is illustrative and a portent of
things to come when the major sticking point was a discussion of the number
of Army and Marine forces and the number of USAF fighter squadrons. The
person who was arguing for more Air Force and less ground forces was
Wolfowitz.
I then became the Chief of War Plans Division and began work on the next
generation of War Plans. As we were trying to figure out how to execute the
requirements in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCAP), the bi-annual
document where CINCs are tasked for war planning, we encounter a problem.
As George H.W. Bush and Cheney were carrying out the "Peace Dividend" they
started an aggressive program to downsize the Armed Forces. As you remember
we dramatically cut the size of the military during this timeframe. This
reduction of the military was at odds with the tasks to the CINCs in the
JSCAP; there were not enough forces to meet the taskings to CINCCENT (SWA
MRC) and CINCPAC (Korea MRC). We in CENTCOM were the genesis of the Two MRC
strategy when we got Gen Hoar to assign unacceptable risk to our OPLAN when
war in SWA followed war in Korea . The major point here is Bush the first
and Cheney as the SecDef began the cutting of our military to the point
where we could not execute the taskings of the JSCAP.
In the 1994 planning cycle we hit an immediate hurdle. The JSCAP directs
CINCS to use the National Intelligence Estimate as the basis for the threat
assessment that is building block for the respective OPLANs. I got very
involved in this and had many meetings with the CIA (responsible for the
NIEs) and DIA. For any who have seen inside the NIE process you are quickly
disabused of the idea that NIEs are pure intelligence. The NIE process is
fraught with politics. It is supposed to be a consensus document, that is,
intelligence assessment by committee. This NIE had serious fundamental
flaws and we got the new CINC, Gen Peay to non-concur and to request the
CJCS allow CENTCOM to use the CENTCOM intelligence assessment as the basis
for planning vice the NIE; this was unprecedented. After a year of debate
we finally won. This is also illustrative of things to come.
It was in the planning for this OPLAN where we began to have serious
internal CENTCOM debate on Phase V, post conflict. The discussions included
most every issue that has now come to light in the current war. Fundamental
to our assessment was the complex society that was Iraq. Saddam Hussein was
the glue that held Iraq together. If we remove Saddam there was a great
chance that Iraq would come apart at the seams. Combine that with the fact
that we were charged by the JSCAP to defeat Saddam while 1) maintaining as a
nation-state, and 2) insuring Iraq remained a counter-balance to Iran and 3)
had the capability for self defense. This required some new thinking about
how we approached post conflict operations. This was to be the first OPLAN
that seriously addressed this complex phase of the operation, for we had no
doubt we could win "the war," but we had to insure we had a plan "to win the
peace." This OPLAN was eventually approved by the then SecDef, William
Perry.
The 1996 planning cycle then provided more detail to post conflict
operations. We had another huge debate with OSD regarding the number of
ground forces vice the number of air forces. We conducted detailed modeling
and simulation to defend our force ratios. One of the other important
aspects of our justification for ground forces was post conflict operations.
There was tremendous pressure from OSD that mirrored the Air Staff view that
precision weapons delivered by air would win the war and we could cut ground
forces significantly. In the end, SecDef Cohen approved the OPLAN.
I spent two years in another assignment and in 1998 I was assigned as the
G3, Third US Army/ARCENT working for then LTG Tommy Franks. CINCCENT Tony
Zinni designated ARCENT as the Combined Force Land Component Commander
(CFLCC). In this capacity ARCENT was responsible, in peacetime, for planning
and coordinating all land operations, and in war, employing all land forces.
As we developed the land operations in support of CENTCOMs OPLAN and briefed
it to Gen Zinni, he was most uncomfortable with post conflict planning;
there was not enough detail. Gen Zinni fully understood the complexities in
Iraq and the role that Saddam played. He also said that what kept him awake
at night was the thought that Saddam "might die in his sleep" or "be
assassinated," and the US would be left to go into Iraq to quell the ensuing
chaos. We then went into several months of detailed planning for post
conflict operations. Every possible scenario and every branch and sequel
that could be conceived was identified and planned for. Gen Zinni also knew
that even with the best of military plans, the solution to post conflict had
to include the interagency process of the US Government. He caused a two
day meeting in Tysons Corner where the CENTCOM plan, the Service Component
Commanders plans were presented to a large interagency working group. In
the end this effort failed because the various agencies of the US Government
refused to take responsibility for their Titled functional areas.
Nevertheless, for the first time there was a detailed military plan for post
conflict operations. These plans covered consequence that has come to pass
since we invaded Iraq. The person who briefed the land component plan was
LTG Franks.
So Bush the second was convinced we needed to go into Iraq and remove
Saddam. We had a military plan that was developed and improved upon since
1992 and had been briefed to every SecDef that served during that timeframe.
Success depended on very thoroughly thought out and war gamed force levels.
The plan had very detailed concepts for post conflict operations. The first
thing the serving SecDef, Rumsfeld, did was tell CENTCOM to trash the OPLAN.
Rumsfeld and his advisors believed that we could win with "shock and awe"
and didn't need many ground forces. In the total ignorance of Iraq and Arab
culture, Rumsfeld and his advisors said they didn't have responsibility for
nation building. Rumsfeld and his advisors based their justification on the
current Iraq NIE. Who was the primary advisor, none other than Paul
Wolfowitz. The Army and Marine Corps has been hand cuffed since they
crossed the Line of Departure. The lack of ground forces has now proven to
be the fundamental flaw of the Rumsfeld strategy, and we have never
recovered from this. Key to the Zinni post conflict plan was keeping the
Iraqi Army intact. There were plans for how to not destroy the Iraqi Army
so that they could be the foundation for rebuilding the Iraqi military so
that Iraq could remain a counter balance to Iran. Also key to our post
conflict plan was rapidly rebuilding an Iraqi government. The first acts of
Paul Bremmer were to disband the Iraqi Army and refuse to allow former
Baathists in the new government. If the paucity of ground forces didn't
doom the U.S. effort, these two acts did. We have been playing catch-up
ever since. The Army and Marines have carried this war and every success we
have had has been on the backs of the Soldiers and Marines that walk patrol
everyday.
The military of our country is charged with fighting our nation's wars.
Since the end of the first Gulf War our military has been reduced to levels
below required to defend our national interests. Funding for our military,
as a percentage of GNP, has been at the lowest in generations. We have a
military planning process that is designed to execute our National Military
Strategy. We have a professional military that knows how to fight our
nation's wars. Unfortunately when the military strategy is ignored by
so-called civilian experts, when we have a generation of senior military
leadership that have been cowed by a "my way or the highway" SecDef, we have
the mess we are in now. The Army is unfairly taking the blame for this
debacle in Iraq. The Army is too small for the requirements asked of it,
its people are over-extended and tired, its equipment is in shambles, and
its future modernization is in jeopardy due to funding. The Army and the
United States of America will unfairly pay for this folly for generations.
Key to the Zinni post conflict plan was keeping the
Iraqi Army intact. There were plans for how to not destroy the Iraqi Army
so that they could be the foundation for rebuilding the Iraqi military so
that Iraq could remain a counter balance to Iran. Also key to our post
conflict plan was rapidly rebuilding an Iraqi government. The first acts of
Paul Bremmer were to disband the Iraqi Army and refuse to allow former
Baathists in the new government. If the paucity of ground forces didn't
doom the U.S. effort, these two acts did. We have been playing catch-up
ever since. The Army and Marines have carried this war and every success we have had has been on the backs of the Soldiers and Marines that walk patrol everyday.
***************************************
RICHARD L. STOUDER
Director Technology Development and Deployment
National Security Directorate
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
I was assigned to US Central Command in 1992 after graduating from the
National War College. For my first year I was assigned as the lead for the
OPLAN that was the redux of Desert Shield - Desert Storm. The culmination
of that first year was Gen Hoar and I briefing the OPLAN for approval to the
SecDef. In the room were Dick Cheney, the CJCS, Colin Powell, and the one
of Cheney's Undersecs, Paul Wolfowitz. This was the first rewritten OPLAN
since the first Gulf War. I think it is illustrative and a portent of
things to come when the major sticking point was a discussion of the number
of Army and Marine forces and the number of USAF fighter squadrons. The
person who was arguing for more Air Force and less ground forces was
Wolfowitz.
I then became the Chief of War Plans Division and began work on the next
generation of War Plans. As we were trying to figure out how to execute the
requirements in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCAP), the bi-annual
document where CINCs are tasked for war planning, we encounter a problem.
As George H.W. Bush and Cheney were carrying out the "Peace Dividend" they
started an aggressive program to downsize the Armed Forces. As you remember
we dramatically cut the size of the military during this timeframe. This
reduction of the military was at odds with the tasks to the CINCs in the
JSCAP; there were not enough forces to meet the taskings to CINCCENT (SWA
MRC) and CINCPAC (Korea MRC). We in CENTCOM were the genesis of the Two MRC
strategy when we got Gen Hoar to assign unacceptable risk to our OPLAN when
war in SWA followed war in Korea . The major point here is Bush the first
and Cheney as the SecDef began the cutting of our military to the point
where we could not execute the taskings of the JSCAP.
In the 1994 planning cycle we hit an immediate hurdle. The JSCAP directs
CINCS to use the National Intelligence Estimate as the basis for the threat
assessment that is building block for the respective OPLANs. I got very
involved in this and had many meetings with the CIA (responsible for the
NIEs) and DIA. For any who have seen inside the NIE process you are quickly
disabused of the idea that NIEs are pure intelligence. The NIE process is
fraught with politics. It is supposed to be a consensus document, that is,
intelligence assessment by committee. This NIE had serious fundamental
flaws and we got the new CINC, Gen Peay to non-concur and to request the
CJCS allow CENTCOM to use the CENTCOM intelligence assessment as the basis
for planning vice the NIE; this was unprecedented. After a year of debate
we finally won. This is also illustrative of things to come.
It was in the planning for this OPLAN where we began to have serious
internal CENTCOM debate on Phase V, post conflict. The discussions included
most every issue that has now come to light in the current war. Fundamental
to our assessment was the complex society that was Iraq. Saddam Hussein was
the glue that held Iraq together. If we remove Saddam there was a great
chance that Iraq would come apart at the seams. Combine that with the fact
that we were charged by the JSCAP to defeat Saddam while 1) maintaining as a
nation-state, and 2) insuring Iraq remained a counter-balance to Iran and 3)
had the capability for self defense. This required some new thinking about
how we approached post conflict operations. This was to be the first OPLAN
that seriously addressed this complex phase of the operation, for we had no
doubt we could win "the war," but we had to insure we had a plan "to win the
peace." This OPLAN was eventually approved by the then SecDef, William
Perry.
The 1996 planning cycle then provided more detail to post conflict
operations. We had another huge debate with OSD regarding the number of
ground forces vice the number of air forces. We conducted detailed modeling
and simulation to defend our force ratios. One of the other important
aspects of our justification for ground forces was post conflict operations.
There was tremendous pressure from OSD that mirrored the Air Staff view that
precision weapons delivered by air would win the war and we could cut ground
forces significantly. In the end, SecDef Cohen approved the OPLAN.
I spent two years in another assignment and in 1998 I was assigned as the
G3, Third US Army/ARCENT working for then LTG Tommy Franks. CINCCENT Tony
Zinni designated ARCENT as the Combined Force Land Component Commander
(CFLCC). In this capacity ARCENT was responsible, in peacetime, for planning
and coordinating all land operations, and in war, employing all land forces.
As we developed the land operations in support of CENTCOMs OPLAN and briefed
it to Gen Zinni, he was most uncomfortable with post conflict planning;
there was not enough detail. Gen Zinni fully understood the complexities in
Iraq and the role that Saddam played. He also said that what kept him awake
at night was the thought that Saddam "might die in his sleep" or "be
assassinated," and the US would be left to go into Iraq to quell the ensuing
chaos. We then went into several months of detailed planning for post
conflict operations. Every possible scenario and every branch and sequel
that could be conceived was identified and planned for. Gen Zinni also knew
that even with the best of military plans, the solution to post conflict had
to include the interagency process of the US Government. He caused a two
day meeting in Tysons Corner where the CENTCOM plan, the Service Component
Commanders plans were presented to a large interagency working group. In
the end this effort failed because the various agencies of the US Government
refused to take responsibility for their Titled functional areas.
Nevertheless, for the first time there was a detailed military plan for post
conflict operations. These plans covered consequence that has come to pass
since we invaded Iraq. The person who briefed the land component plan was
LTG Franks.
So Bush the second was convinced we needed to go into Iraq and remove
Saddam. We had a military plan that was developed and improved upon since
1992 and had been briefed to every SecDef that served during that timeframe.
Success depended on very thoroughly thought out and war gamed force levels.
The plan had very detailed concepts for post conflict operations. The first
thing the serving SecDef, Rumsfeld, did was tell CENTCOM to trash the OPLAN.
Rumsfeld and his advisors believed that we could win with "shock and awe"
and didn't need many ground forces. In the total ignorance of Iraq and Arab
culture, Rumsfeld and his advisors said they didn't have responsibility for
nation building. Rumsfeld and his advisors based their justification on the
current Iraq NIE. Who was the primary advisor, none other than Paul
Wolfowitz. The Army and Marine Corps has been hand cuffed since they
crossed the Line of Departure. The lack of ground forces has now proven to
be the fundamental flaw of the Rumsfeld strategy, and we have never
recovered from this. Key to the Zinni post conflict plan was keeping the
Iraqi Army intact. There were plans for how to not destroy the Iraqi Army
so that they could be the foundation for rebuilding the Iraqi military so
that Iraq could remain a counter balance to Iran. Also key to our post
conflict plan was rapidly rebuilding an Iraqi government. The first acts of
Paul Bremmer were to disband the Iraqi Army and refuse to allow former
Baathists in the new government. If the paucity of ground forces didn't
doom the U.S. effort, these two acts did. We have been playing catch-up
ever since. The Army and Marines have carried this war and every success we
have had has been on the backs of the Soldiers and Marines that walk patrol
everyday.
The military of our country is charged with fighting our nation's wars.
Since the end of the first Gulf War our military has been reduced to levels
below required to defend our national interests. Funding for our military,
as a percentage of GNP, has been at the lowest in generations. We have a
military planning process that is designed to execute our National Military
Strategy. We have a professional military that knows how to fight our
nation's wars. Unfortunately when the military strategy is ignored by
so-called civilian experts, when we have a generation of senior military
leadership that have been cowed by a "my way or the highway" SecDef, we have
the mess we are in now. The Army is unfairly taking the blame for this
debacle in Iraq. The Army is too small for the requirements asked of it,
its people are over-extended and tired, its equipment is in shambles, and
its future modernization is in jeopardy due to funding. The Army and the
United States of America will unfairly pay for this folly for generations.